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MISCEGENATION IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS*
Law and Reason Versus The Restatement Second
Albert A. Ehrenzweigt
Walter Wheeler Cook and Ernest Lorenzen, perhaps the greatest
American scholars in this field, felt obliged to spend much of their life-
work in the destruction of that grand and dangerous experiment of the
American Law Institute, the so-called Restatement of the Law of Con-
flict of Laws. Many of our own generation, led by judges like Roger
Traynor and writers like Currie, Rheinstein, Stumberg and Yntema,
have contributed their share to the task. They have done their job
well. So well that for many years well meaning teachers and writers
have discouraged their students and colleagues from continuing the work
of destruction because the Restatement was "dead."
But it seems that the fight will have to be fought again. The Re-
statement is not dead by any means. The highest court of at least one
state has continued to declare that "it will generally follow the Restate-
ment. . ... I Other states similarly suffering from dearth of precedents,
have been inclined to follow suit. Abroad, the Restatement has remained
the primary, if not the sole, source of American conflicts law2 And-
most important and most disturbing-the Institute, defying the virtually
unanimous judgment of leading courts and writers, has decided to renew,
nay to double, the threat of its first venture in a Restatement of the Law
Second. It has renewed the threat because it has virtually ignored the
work of Cook and Lorenzen and retained the theoretical fundament and
framework of the original. It has doubled the threat because, after
removal of the most glaring inaccuracies of the original under the guid-
ance of an able reporter, the deceptively simple formulas which ap-
parently are to be retained will tempt courts and lawyers unlearned in
the field even more effectively than the earlier cruder experiment.
In the law of marriage, where conflicts law comes, perhaps, closer to
human problems than elsewhere, this temptation may become particularly
* The author is greatly indebted to his colleague, Professor Barbara N. Armstrong, for
valuable criticism and suggestions.
This is the second in a series of two articles prepared for the Cornell Law Quarterly by
Professor Ehrenzweig. The first study, "Alienation of Affections In the Conflict of Laws,"
appeared at 45 Cornell L.Q. 514 (1960).
t See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 722, for biographical data.
1 Irwin v. Murphy, 81 Ariz. 148, 152, 302 P.2d 534, 537 (1956). For additional authority
and analysis, see Ehrenzweig, "The Restatement as a Source of Conflicts Law in Arizona-
A Dangerous Error," 2 Ariz. L. Rev. - (1960).
2 See Ehrenzweig, "American Private International Law and the 'Restatement,'" 28
Nordisk Tidsskrift for International Ret 229 (1958); "Zum Handwerkszeug des amerikan-
ischen internationalen Privatrechts," 7 Osterreichische Zeitschrift fiir Offentliches Recht
521 (1956); "El Restatement Americano del Conficto de Derechos," [1954] Cuardernos
Derecho Anglo-American 37.
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serious. Here, the American Law Institute's new fanciful creation of a
"state of paramount interest ' 3 threatens to add a submyth to Professor
Beale's highly objectionable myth of "legislative jurisdiction."4 This
state is defined as the "state where at least one of the parties was domi-
ciled at the time of the marriage and where both intend to make their
home thereafter"; 5 and the law of that state is given overriding effect
for the purpose of both validating and invalidating foreign marriages.6
It is with the alleged invalidating effect of the law of the "state of para-
mount interest" that this article is primarily concerned.
The Institute assures us that cases establishing this effect are "com-
paratively rare because the state of paramount interest will normally
make the validity of a marriage depend upon its compliance with the
requirements of the state where it took place."7 This may or may not be
true concerning marriages attacked because of non-age,8 "incest," 9 or
3 Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws § 120, at 94 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1957) [here-
inafter referred to as Rest. Second, Tent. Draft or the Draft].
4 Cf. Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 8-9 (1959).
5 Rest. Second, Tent. Draft § 120, at 94. See also id. § 132. Cook, The Logical and Legal
Bases of the Conflict of Laws 448 (1942), would have given similar prominence to the
state of the "intended family domicile." Beale, et al., "Marriage and the Domicil," 44
Harv. L. Rev. 501, 523 (1931) "summarily dismissed" both concept and theory.
6 Rest. Second §§ 122, 132.
7 Id. § 120, at 94.
8 The courts seem split concerning the weight to be given to their own laws as to
marriages invalid under the age or consent requirements of the forum but valid in the
state of celebration. For validity: See, e.g., State v. Graves, 228 Ark. 378, 307 S.W.2d
545 (1957); McDonald v. McDonald, 6 Cal. 2d 457, 58 P.2d 163 (1936); Spencer v. People,
133 Colo. 196, 292 P.2d 971 (1956); Payne v. Payne, 121 Colo. 212, 214 P.2d 495 (1950);
Noble v. Noble, 299 Mich. 565, 300 N.W. 885 (1941); Keith v. Pack, 182 Tenn. 420, 187
S.W.2d 618 (1945). Against validity: See, e.g., Wilkins v. Zelichowski, 26 NJ. 370, 140
A.2d 65 (1958); Cunningham v. Cunningham, 206 N.Y. 341, 99 N.E. 845 (1912). In the
Wilkins case the court expressly excepted cases involving foreign domiciliaries, 26 NJ. 370,
377, 140 A.2d 65, 69. See also Anton & Francescakis, "Modern Scots 'Runaway Marriages,'"
[1958] Jurid. Rev. 253; Note, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 693 (1949); Annot., 104 A.L.R. 1294
(1936). For a somewhat intemperate attack against a Belgian decision holding invalid the
New York marriage of a Belgian minor with a New York girl which would have been
valid in New York, see Beale, " The Law of Capacity in International Marriages," 15
Harv. L. Rev. 382, 394 (1902), ascribing this and similar decisions based on the parties'
personal law to the fact that "in European countries ... [in contrast to the common
law which "regards man as a natural creature"], natural facts and powers of human life
are nothing to the law until the law makes them so." Id. at 382. Concerning marriages
invalid at the place of celebration but valid under the law of the (usually domiciliary)
forum see infra note 87.
9 In re May's Estate, 305 N.Y. 486, 114 N.E.2d 4 (1953), upheld a Rhode Island mar-
riage between uncle and niece under Rhode Island law although the spouses were New
York domiciliaries at all relevant times. See also, e.g., People v. Siems, 198 In. App. 342
(1916); Mazzolini v. Mazzolini, 168 Ohio St. 357, 155 N.E.2d 206 (1958) (first cousins,
upheld as merely voidable under the forum law of first matrimonial domicile); In re
Miller's Estate, 239 Mich. 455, 214 N.W. 428 (1927); Osoinach v. Watkins, 235 Ala. 564,
180 So. 577 (1938) ; Annots., 117 A.L.R. 186 (1938) ; 127 A.L.R. 437 (1940).
Among the more recent cases, Bucca v. State, 43 N.J. Super. 315, 321, 128 A.2d 506, 510
(1957), invalidating under New Jersey law a marriage between uncle and niece concluded
validly under Italian law, relies on the assumption that "these parties at the time of cere-
mony in Italy (intended) to establish their family domicil in New Jersey." But plaintiff
had returned to New Jersey and desired to bring his wife to the state so that the forum
was also the state of the present domicile. See also In re Mortenson's Estate, 83 Ariz 87,
316 P2d 1106 (1957) (first cousins). See generally Kingsley, "The Law of Infants' Mar-
riages," 9 Vand. L. Rev. 593, 603 (1956).
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non-compliance with form requirements.10 But the Institute's assurance
is certainly misleading with regard to those very cases in which the prob-
lem will arise most dramatically, namely with regard to the cases involv-
ing so-called "interracial" marriages. 1 Here, a "state of paramount
interest" that invalidates such marriages will generally refuse to defer
to the law of the place of celebration. 2
10 Most important are common law marriages and marriages by proxy. Concerning the
latter, compare, e.g., United States v. Snyder, 177 F.2d 44 (D.D.C. 1949), with Barrons v.
United States, 191 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1951). See also, e.g., In re Valente's Will, 18 Misc. 2d
701, 188 N.Y.S.2d 732 (Surr. Ct. King's County 1959); Ponticelli v. Ponticelli, [1958] 2
Weekly L.R. 439; Note, [19581 Camb. L.J. 146; Lorenzen, "Marriage by Proxy and the
Conflict of Laws," 32 Harv. L. Rev. 473 (1919); De Nova, "La Legge Regolatrice del
Matrimonio Celebrato per Procura," 11 Guir. Comp. DIP 3 (1954); Stern, "Marriages by
Proxy in Mexico," 19 So. Cal. L. Rev. 109 (1945); Note, 33 Cornell L.Q. 129 (1947). In
the great majority of cases common law marriages concluded in a state recognizing such
marriages have been recognized in non-common law states even as to forum domiciliaries.
Travers v. Reinhardt, 205 U.S. 423 (1907); Madewell v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 329
(E.D. Tenn. 1949); Gradias v. Gradias, 51 Ariz. 35, 74 P.2d 53 (1937); In re McKanna's
Estate, 106 Cal. App. 2d 126, 234 P.2d 673 (1951) (domicile not required under Texas
law); In re Tersip's Estate, 86 Cal. App. 2d 43, 194 P.2d 66 (1948) ; In re Foster, 77 Idaho
26, 287 P.2d 282 (1955) (also valid in forum); Boltz v. Boltz, 325 Mass. 726, 92 N.E.2d
365 (1950); Craddock's Case, 310 Mass. 232, 37 N.E.2d 508 (1941); Bourelle v. Soo-Crete,
Inc., 156 Neb. 731, 87 N.W.2d 371 (1958); Shea v. Shea, 268 App. Div. 677, 52 N.Y.S.2d
756 (2d Dep't 1945), rev'd on other grounds, 294 N.Y. 909, 63 N.E.2d 113 (1945) ; Welsh v.
Surface Transportation Co., 7 Misc. 2d 167, 161 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1957);
Skinner v. Skinner, 150 N.Y.S.2d 739 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1956); In re Schneider's Will,
206 Misc. 18, 131 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Surr. Ct. King's County 1954); Red Eagle v. Cannon, 201
Okla. 511, 208 P.2d 557 (1949); Troxel v. Jones, 322 S.W.2d 251 (Tenn. App. 1958); In re
Gallagher's Estate, 35 Wash. 2d 512, 213 P.2d 621 (1950). Peirce v. Peirce, 379 Il. 185,
39 N.E.2d 990 (1942) would recognize such marriages only as to non-domiciliaries.
Decisions denying the existence of common-law marriages allegedly entered into in
sister states are usually based on a finding of non-compliance with the law of that
state rather than on a finding of continued forum domicile. See, e.g., Tatum v. Tatum,
241 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1957); Rittgers v. United States, 154 F.2d 768 (8th Cir.
1946); Ponzi v. Ponzi, 157 Cal. App. 2d 772, 321 P.2d 847 (1958); Abramson v. Abramson,
161 Neb. 782, 74 N.W.2d 919 (1956); In re Binger's Estate, 158 Neb. 444, 63 N.W.2d 784
(1954); Winn v. Wiggins, 47 N.J. Super. 215, 135 A.2d 673 (1957); State v. Superior Court,
23 Wash. 2d 357, 161 P.2d 188 (1945). See also Harleysville Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Carroll,
50 DeL Super. 67, 123 A.2d 128 (1956); Jambrone v. David, 16 Ill. 2d 32, 156 N.E.2d 569
(1959); Kennedy v. Damron, 268 S.W.2d 22 (Ky. 1954); Ropken v. Ropken, 169 Neb.
352, 99 N.W.2d 480 (1959). Cf. In re Vetas' Estate, 110 Utah 187, 170 P.2d 183 (1946).
11 The provisions concerning the treatment of foreign remarriage prohibitions are omitted
in this analysis. See Rest. Second, Tent. Draft §§ 130, 131; notes 32, 88 infra.
12 For decisions to this effect, see generally Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 240 (1949). Cf. Beale,
et al., "Marriage and the Domicil," 44 Harv. L. Rev. 501, 512 (1931); Taintor, "Marriage
in the Conflict of Laws," 9 Vand. L. Rev. 607, 613 (1956); Storke, "Annulment in the
Conflict of Laws," 43 Minn. L. Rev. 849, 866 (1959); Notes, 16 Minn. L. Rev. 172, 175
(1931), 20 So. Cal. L. Rev. 80, 85 (1946). See also In re Takahashi's Estate, 113 Mont.
490, 129 P.2d 217 (1942) (Montana statute since repealed) ; Ehrenzweig, Ikehara & Jensen,
American-Japanese Private International Law (forthcoming); Note, 17 Tenn. L. Rev. 378,
383 (1942). Even minority states have been prepared to recognize interracial marriages
concluded under a validating law without intent to return to the forum. See State v.
Ross, 76 N.C. 242 (1877); Miller v. Lucks, 203 Miss. 824, 36 So. 2d 140 (1948); Caballero
v. Executor, 24 La. Ann. 573 (1872). Massachusetts treated her own prohibition (since
repealed) as one not invalidating a marriage celebrated in a majority state. Medway v.
Nedham, 16 Mass. 157 (1819). California upheld a Utah interracial marriage against the
laws of both the forum and the former domicile. Pearson v. Pearson, 51 Cal. 120, 125
(1875). See also Whittington v. McCaskill, 65 Fla. 162, 61 So. 236 (1913); State v. Hand,
87 Neb. 189, 126 N.W. 1002 (1910) (facts supplemented in Taintor, "Effect of Extra-State
Marriage Ceremonies," 10 Miss. L.J. 105, 120 (1938)). For a later case, see People v.
Godines, 17 Cal. App. 2d 721, 62 P.2d 787 (1936) (dictum). See generally Rodgers,
"Validity of Marriages where the Contract is Entered into in a jurisdiction other than
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A minority of states continue to enforce their "miscegenation statutes"
which prohibit, either civilly or criminally, or both, marriages between
"white persons" and persons of other "races," primarily "Negroes."'' 3
It is likely that the Supreme Court of the United States will ultimately
declare such statutes unconstitutional and thus eliminate conflicts prob-
lems in this field. But the Court may postpone this decision.'4 In the
meantime, a significant, though necessarily limited, alleviation of the
problem could conceivably be achieved by courts of majority states which
would be prepared to adjudicate, by declaratory judgment, the validity of
local inter-racial marriages. Such judgments would be entitled to full
faith and credit throughout the nation.' 5 In any event, many and serious
conflicts problems will continue to arise. Majority states will be asked
to recognize "interracial" marriages purportedly invalid at the place of
celebration or premarital domicile, and minority states will be faced
with such marriages alleged to be valid at either place.
The (First) Restatement expressly includes such marriages among
those subject to invalidation by the "law of the state of domicile of
either party." 6 The published Draft of the Second Restatement would
continue expressly to subject such marriages to the law of the domiciliary
state (now redefined as the state of "paramount interest"), but would
have relegated this controversial "rule" to the comment.' 7 And now we
understand that the Institute, in response to the criticism of its mem-
bers, has deleted even this discreet reference.' But this deletion will not
that of the Domicile of the Parties," 31 Am. L. Rev. 524 (1897). For the status of the
domicile myth in the law of divorce, see Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 234 (1959).
13 For a criticism of this terminology, see, e.g., Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 724,
198 P.2d 17, 21 (1948).
Forty states, beginning with Maryland in 1661, have at one time had statutes against
"interracial" marriages. Note, 10 Wyo. L.J. 131 (1956). Riley, "Miscegenation Statutes-
A Re-evaluation of their Constitutionality in Light of Changing Social and Political Con-
ditions," 32 So. Cal. L. Rev. 28 (1958), lists 24 states which, as of 1958, had preserved
their miscegenation statutes. Of these, two have since repealed theirs. Idaho Laws 1959,
ch. 44, at 89; Nevada Statutes 195,9, ch. 193, § 1, at 216. See generally Weinberger, "A
Reappraisal of the Constitutionality of Miscegenation Statutes," 42 Cornell L.Q. 208 (1957),
brought up to date, 6 Revue de Droit International pour le Moyen-Orient 79 (1957); Com-
ments, 32 Calif. L. Rev. 269 (1944), Selected Readings on Family Law 277 (1950); 36
Yale L.. 858 (1927). See also Notes, 11 Fla. L. Rev. 235 (1958); 19 La. L. Rev. 700
(1959); 30 Miss. L.J. 326 (1959); 11 Okla. L. Rev. 305 (1958); 11 W. Res. L. Rev. 93
(1959) ; 3 Wyo. L.J. 159 (1948) ; 10 Wyo. L.J. 131 (1956).
'4 The court avoided the issue in Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749,
vacated & remanded, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), decision adhered to, 197 Va. 734 90 S.E.2d 849,
app. denied, 350 U.S. 985 (1956). See also Jackson v. State, 37 Ala. App. 519, 72 So. 2d
114, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 888 (1954).
15 See generally Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 165 (1959). Declaratory judgments on
issues not truly controverted, would probably require statutory authorization. Borchard,
Declaratory judgments 36, 138, 480 (2d ed. 1941). An alternative solution could, in proper
cases, be found in the requirements of full faith and credit to administrative acts, extended
to constitutive licensing acts of sister states. See Ehrenzweig, op. cit. supra at 174.
16 Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 132(d) (1934).
17 Rest. Second, Tent. Draft § 132, comment b (3).
18 For this information I am indebted to Professor Willis L. M. Reese, the Reporter of
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do. So long as "interracial marriages" are not expressly exempted from
the ominous regime of the "state of paramount interest," courts may,
and in view of the previous utterances of the two "Restatements" prob-
ably will, continue to find the "rule" implied in the broad language of
the text.
The problem faced by these courts is the principal subject of this
article which will deal with other facets of the conflicts law of marriage
only where this is required by the broader implications of this problem.
Within a scope thus limited, emphasis will be upon interstate cases
dealing with the marital status, and upon those cases in which the state
of "paramount interest" is a state other than that of the forum. For it
is these cases which alone are solvable on principles of choice of law,
and it is as to those cases that the "rules" of the Draft are wholly inac-
curate, with regard to both marriages valid and those invalid under the
law of celebration.
MARRIAGES VALID WHERE CELEBRATED
A "white" woman domiciled in Illinois and a "Negro" domiciled in
Mississippi desire to marry. Since Mississippi treats "interracial" mar-
riages as invalid, they enter into a marriage ceremony in California which
has no such "miscegenation" law, but- intend to make their home in
Mississippi. Immediately after the ceremony, having realized the risks
inherent in this plan, they decide to stay in California. Can it seriously
be contended that a court of that state will hold a marriage, validly con-
cluded under its own law, invalid merely because it has been "proved"
that, at the moment of the ceremony, the spouses had intended to return
to the husband's home state?1" The American Law Institute would ap-
parently so hold, and would even extend invalidity beyond domicile and
place of celebration into any "fourth State,"'  because, says Professor
Beale, "every state should acknowledge the privilege of the domicil to
deny the status, however out of sympathy it may be with the particular
manifestation thereof."'" This apparently would be in recognition of the
"logical development of the power of the domicil over the marital status,
the Second Restatement. The original wording of the Draft was attacked in the general
discussion. See ALI Proceedings 443 (1957).
19 Section 132 of the (First) Restatement would extend this invalidating effect in certain
cases to "the law of the state of domicil of either party," whether or not the spouses had
intended to make their home there. For criticism, see Cook, op. cit. supra note 5; Stumberg,
Conflict of Laws 290 (2d ed. 1951). Professor Beale's own views seem to require the
two domiciliary laws to coincide. 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws 693 (1935).
20 Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 132, comment d, illustr. 3 (1934). To Beale, et al.,
"Marriage and the Domicil," 44 Harv. L. Rev. 501, 526 n.84 (1931) there is "dearly no
reason for a distinction" between cases arising at the original domicile and in other states,
which are said to include the state of celebration (at n.83).
21 Beale, et al., supra note 5, at 528.
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a power which is emphatically granted by the current of common-law
opinion."2 2 Neither such a power nor the "paramount interest" of the
Second Restatement has ever been "current" in the history of the com-
mon law.
Until the Reformation, the conflicts law of the Church, which since
the 10th century had acquired the primary jurisdiction in marriage mat-
ters,23 was limited to the "interpersonal" treatment of pagan and heretic
marriages. Even when other problems arose, such as priest marriages
prohibited in some and tolerated in other parts of Christendom, the all-
embracing character of the Church precluded territorial solutions.24
And when, after the Reformation, English courts first faced territorial
conflicts, they reached a result directly opposed to Professor Beale's
"emphatical" message of the common law. Thus, in what is probably
the leading early English case adjudicating the validity of a foreign
marriage, the court announced that "the laws of the country where the
marriage is celebrated are to be the rule by which the validity of it is
to be tried," and this even in cases where the inhabitants of the forum
state in order to evade their own law forbidding such marriages "go to a
country where they are allowed, and marry there in transitu."25 In ac-
cordance with this principle, English courts, at least until the middle of
the nineteenth century, quite generally upheld marriages valid at the
place of celebration as to both form and capacity and without regard
to the law prevailing at either party's domicile even where this domicile
was England.2" This practice has, in substance, continued with regard
to form requirements 7 But even as to capacity there was no recognition
of a "power" of the parties' domicile even when the House of Lords, in
22 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws 697 (1935). See, however, id. at 666, where the "general
rule" is stated differently. Beale could also have escaped his untenable result as to mis-
cegenation without abandoning his general approach, by classifying miscegenation as a
legal incapacity which he would subject to the law of celebration because "capacity, of
itself, is merely one of the facts of a transaction and not a status." Beale, et al., supra
note 5, at 518.
23 Salvioli, La giurisdizione patrimoniale e la giurisdizione della Chiesa in Italia prima
del mille 141 (Modena 1884). See also, e.g., 1 Feine, Kirchliche Rechtsgeschichte 357 ff.
(1950).
24 See generally 1 Esmein, Le Mariage en Droit Canonique 247 ff., 328, 334 (1929);
Feine, op. cit. supra note 23, at 617; 2 Eichmann-Mrsdorf, Lehrbuch des Kirchenrechts
261 ff. (6th ed. 1959).
25 Scrimshire v. Scrimshire, 2 Hag. Con. 395, 414, 161 Eng. Rep. 782, 789 (1752). The
case involved a marriage invalid at the place of celebration, note 62 infra. See also Kent
v. Burgess, 11 Sim. 361, 59 Eng. Rep. 913 (1840) (English domiciliaries' marriage in Bel-
gium complying with English requirements held invalid under Belgian law); Berthiaume
v. Dastous, (1930] A.C. 79 (1929) (similar facts and holding).
26 See Dicey's Conflict of Laws 231, 250 (7th ed. 1958).
27 See, e.g., Swift v. Kelly, 3 Knapp 257, 12 Eng. Rep. 648 (1835) (Spanish Catholic
marriage); Compton v. Bearcroft, Bull. N.P. 113 (Court of Delegates 1768) (Scottish
clandestine marriage). For more recent cases, see Dicey's Conflict of Laws 230 ft. (7th ed.
1958). As to the "wrong" judgment by a divided House of Lords in Reg. v. Millis, 10 CL
& Fin. 534, 8 Eng. Rep. 844 (1844), see Falconbridge, Conflict of Laws 717 (2d ed. 1954).
[Vol. 45
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1861, held invalid as incestuous under English law a marriage valid under
the Danish law of celebration.28 To be sure there was stress on the
spouses' English domicile. But England was also the country of the
forum, and not a single English case can be found that recognized the
alleged common law power of the law of the domicile as such by holding
invalid under that law a marriage which would have been valid in England
as well as at the place of celebration.m Indeed, as to miscegenous mar-
riages in particular, it has been suggested in a leading English text that
a marriage valid in the country of its celebration would probably be held
valid in England today though it would have been invalid under a mis-
cegenation law in force at the "domicile of both or either of the parties." 30
Nor does the "power" of the domiciliary law fare better in this coun-
try. Professor Beale cites two cases for his proposition that, if any state
"refuses to attach a status to the valid contract of marriage . . . , all
courts should, in dealing with the marriage of domiciliaries of that
state, decide the question as the courts of the domicil would decide it."131
Neither case is in point.2 Other pertinent cases would have supported
28 Brook v. Brook, 9 H.L. Cas. 193, 11 Eng. Rep. 703 (1861). See also Mette v. Mette,
1 Sw. & Tr. 416, 164 Eng. Rep. 792 (1859) (German valid marriage of British domiciliary
invalid as incestuous under English law); Re Paine, (1940] Ch. 46 (1939) (same); Re
De Wilton, (1900) 2 Ch 481 (same); Pugh v. Pugh, [1951) Prob. Div. 482 (non-age).
29 In Sottomayor v. DeBarros (No. 1), [1877] 3 Prob. Div. 1, the Court of Appeals
had reversed a judgment upholding an English marriage of Portuguese citizens under
English law, on the assumption that the marriage would be invalid under Portuguese law
if both spouses were domiciled in Portugal. But, upon remand, the Probate Division again
upheld the marriage finding the husband to have been domiciled in England at the time
of the marriage. Sottomayor v. DeBarros (No. 2), [1879] 5 Prob. Div. 94. Cf. Dicey's
Conflict of Laws 264 f. (7th ed. 1958). See also Papadopoulos v. Papadopoulos, [1930]
Prob. Div. 55 (1929), upholding an English marriage between a domiciled Cypriot and a
Frenchwoman although Greek-orthodox rules had not been observed.
30 Dicey's Conflict of Laws 266 (7th ed. 1958). In Chetti v. Chetti, [1909] Prob. Div.
67 (1908), the English marriage between a Hindu domiciled in India and an English
woman was upheld against the husband's contention that under the law of his domicile
he could not marry a woman outside his own caste and not a Hindu by religion.
31 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws 697 (1935). But see also Id. at 696: "a third state, regard-
less of the actual pronouncements of the domicil, might decide the validity of the mar-
riage according to the principles revealed by the current trend of common-law authority."
32 In People v. Steere, 184 Mich. 556, 151 N.W. 617 (1915), defendant's conviction for
the abandonment of his wife was set aside because the Michigan marriage had been con-
eluded in violation of the remarriage prohibition of Illinois, the state of the matrimonal
domicile. While using ambiguous language the court, in effect, merely denied the wife's
status as that of an "abandoned wife" under the criminal statute of the forum. The
second case, Hall v. Industrial Commission, 165 Wis. 364, 162 N.W. 312 (1917), concerned
an Indiana marriage entered into by plaintiff in evasion of a remarriage prohibition of
Illinois, the state of her prior divorce and domicile at that time. This marriage was held
invalid in Wisconsin. The decision was based not on the law of either party's premarital
domicile but on the limited effect of the Illinois divorce into which the Illinois remarriage
statute had been "imported," and on the fact that this statute was "substantially the same"
as that of the forum. But see Goodrich, "Foreign Marriages and the Conflict of Laws,"
21 Mich. L. Rev. 743, 758 n.49 (1923), who declares the latter fact 'immaterial"--a rather
peculiar conclusion in the light of the court's express reasoning. Annot., 51 A.L.R. 1412
(1927), fails to add better authority, This case thus leaves intact the rule announced by
the same court in Lanham v. Lanham, 136 Wis. 360, 117 N.W. 787, 788 (1908), according
to which the only exceptions to the general validity of a validly celebrated marriage are
violation of "a law of nature as generally recognized by Christian civilized states" or of
1960]
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the opposite view. 3 It might also have been worth mention that this
opposite view was shared by all American treatises which had previously
dealt with this question. In 1830, Chancellor Kent, in his Commentaries,
had declared the principle to be "settled law . . . that, in respect to
marriage, the lex loci contractus prevails over the lex domicilii, as being
the safer rule, and one dictated by just and enlightened views of inter-
national jurisprudence."34 In 1834, Story discussed the question "how
far a marriage regularly celebrated in a foreign country, between persons
belonging to another country, who have gone thither from their own coun-
try for that purpose, is to be deemed valid if it is not celebrated according
to the law of their own country."" Rejecting civilian authority to the
contrary, he found it "settled, after some struggle, both in England and
America, that such a marriage is good,"36 and stated the same rule with
regard to the capacity to marry. 7 Bishop, in 1864, found "the question
. . . settled, in the way indicated, both in England and America."38
Similarly, Field, in his International Code of 1872, had rejected all
exemptions from the lex celebrationis (except for certain polygamous
or incestuous marriages), without regard to the law of either party's
domicile;39 Rorer's Inter-State Law of 1879 had reached the same con-
clusion.40 Minor, equally ignored by Professor Beale, had stated as late
as 1901 that, "if the parties are domiciled in one State by whose law they
are prohibited to marry, but the marriage occurs in another State where
such marriages are permitted, and the validity of the marriage is im-
pugned in the latter or any third State, the general rule is that the lex
celebrationis, not the lex domicillii, will govern." (Emphasis added.) 4
If Chief Justice Gray's 1880 summary of Massachusetts law had been
noted in its entirety, it would have revealed the same view. Beale, and
a forum law expressly invalidating such marriages "on grounds of public policy." Moreover,
it seems doubtful whether the Institute itself would, in the fact situation of the Hall
case, supra, hold invalid a valid marriage violating the remarriage prohibition of the
premarital domicile. See Rest. Second § 131 (the spouses had established their first
domicile in the forum state); Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 260 (1959).
33 In Dodds v. Pittsburgh, M. & B. Rys., 107 Pa. Super. 20, 162 AtI. 486 (1932), a
Mexican marriage of California residents was upheld under Mexican law against an attack
for fraud, without regard to a subsequent California annulment presumably based on the
domiciliary law of California. In In re Ommang's Estate, 183 Minn. 92, 235 N.W. 529
(1931), an evasionary Minnesota marriage of Wisconsin domiciliaries was upheld as against
a domiciliary prohibition. See Note, 16 Minn. L. Rev. 172, 184 (1931). In Boehm v.
Rohlfs, 224 Iowa 226, 276 N.W. 105 (1937), the Iowa court upheld an evasionary Minne-
sota marriage of Wisconsin domiciliaries as against a Wisconsin prohibition.
34 2 Kent, Commentaries on American Law 79 (1830).
35 Story, Conflict of Laws 115 (1834).
36 Id. at 116.
37 Id. at 87.
38 1 Bishop, Marriage and Divorce 311 (4th ed. 1864).
39 Field, Outlines of an International Code 383-89 (2d ed. 1876).
40 Rorer, American Inter-State Law 177 (1879).
41 Minor, Conflict of Laws 150 (1901).
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his colleagues, in a now classic article on the subject, quote from this
summary the statement of "the general principle, that the status or
condition of a person, the relation in which he stands to another person
... is fixed by the law of the domicil."' They omit the limitation of
this statement to relations by which a person "is qualified or made
capable to take certain rights in that other's property,"4 3 and fail to
mention that Chief Justice Gray, in the same opinion, concludes that the
validity of a contract of marriage "is governed, even as regards the
competency of the contracting parties, by the law of the place of the
contract; that this status, once legally established, should be recognized
everywhere as fully as if created by the law of the domicil; and there-
fore that any such marriage, valid by the law of the place where it is
contracted, is, even if contracted between persons domiciled in this
Commonwealth and incompetent to marry here under our laws ...
valid here to all intents and effects . . .""4 This treatment of judicial
and other authority by Professor Beale and his colleagues casts a strange
light on the concluding sentence in the same article. Here, those are
derided who draw different conclusions from the "psychoanalysis" of
judges instead of reading "the decisions themselves-the Minerva-like
progeny of their emotional disturbances, [which] if you will-show one
underlying principle: control over the marital status rests with the
domicil."45 Psychoanalysis would perhaps trace this outburst to the
absence of those very "decisions" on which the "principle" is alleged to
rely.
Nor has Professor Beale's principle been confirmed by a single case
decided since its formulation. Instead, the highest court of one state
has found it possible to uphold an evasionary marriage in a sister state
under the law of that state contrary to the rule prevailing at the spouses'
domicile in a third state.4" And Professor Stumberg has urged that "in
a search for the proper law to determine the validity of a marriage, em-
phasis upon domiciliary power, or, for that matter, power of any state,
is apt to obscure the real reason for prohibiting certain types of mar-
riages.) 47
This warning has remained unheeded. The American Law Institute
proposes, in substance at least, to retain Professor Beale's clearly inac-
42 Beale, et al., supra note 5, at 503 n.5, quoting from Ross v. Ross, 129 Mass. 243, 246
(1880). The incorrect quotation has been carried into recent case law. See, e.g., Smith v.
Smith, 99 N.H. 362, 111 A.2d 531, 533 (1955).
43 Ross v. Ross, supra note 42.
44 Id. at 247-48.
45 Beale, et al., supra note 5, at 529.
46 Boehm v. Rohlfs, 224 Iowa 226, 276 N.W. 105 (1937); note 33 supra.
47 Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 290 (2d ed. 1951). See also Cook, op. cit. supra note 5,
at 443.
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curate conception of the "current of common law opinion." Even as to
marriages valid at the place of celebration the Reporter of the Second
Restatement suggests that third states would follow "if the State of
paramount interest chose to knock out a marriage on the ground of for-
malities. ... ' To be sure, some miscegenation cases would now be
decided more reasonably than under the rule of the (First) Restatement.
If our California spouses from Illinois and Mississippi had first intended
to settle in Texas, and then had stayed in California, they could then
have remained validly married. For, though they had run afoul of the
laws of both the husband's former and their intended domicile, these
domiciles did not coincide as required in the Second Restatement.
49
Moreover, perhaps less confident than Professor Beale in its conceptualist
approach, the Institute would now delete, both in the text of, and in the
comments to, its new Restatement any specific reference to miscegenous
marriages. 5° But the Institute proposes to retain its first Reporter's
fundamental idea of the ubiquitous "power" of the state of domicile and
would now, for this purpose, expressly endow this state with the dignity
of the state of "paramount interest."'" The California spouses from
Illinois and Mississippi, who made the mistake of "intending" to settle in
Mississippi, the husband's home state, would be held invalidly married
in California, though they have never actually gone back to Mississippi
and have made California their first and last home.52 We are told that
the regime of the state of "paramount interest" which produces such
absurd results "has been adopted by the courts.15 3 But we must be
satisfied with a "see e.g." reference to the case of Hall v. Industrial
Commission which, adduced for the same purpose by Professor Beale,
has been found wanting.54 Judge Goodrich, the Director of the American
Law Institute, maintains in his text, that "in the Anglo-American view
of the matter, it is the sovereign at the domicile, the place where the
person has his permanent abode, who is most concerned in affairs like
his domestic relations,"5 5 and that, therefore, "one state cannot decide
that the domiciliary of another state has contracted a valid marriage."56
48 ALl Proceedings 419 (1957).
49 This result was attacked on the floor of the Institute. ALl Proceedings, at 439.
50 Note 18 supra and accompanying text.
51 Note 3 supra and accompanying text.
52 Cf. ALI Proceedings, supra note 48, at 443.
53 Rest. Second, Tent. Draft 102.
54 Supra note 32.
55 Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 350 (3d ed. 1949). See also Goodrich, "Foreign Marriages
and the Conflict of Laws," 21 Mich. L. Rev. 743 (1923); Stimson, "Law Applicable to
Marriage," 16 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 81 (1942). Cf. Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 182 (1959).
56 Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 367 (3d ed. 1949).
[Vol. 45
MISCEGENATION
Neither statement is supported by any authority, "Anglo-American" or
other.
If the Restatement dogma is wrong on the law, it is even more
clearly so on reason. Any rule which would forever and everywhere tie
a marriage "status" to the law, however inequitable, prevailing at either
or both parties' premarital or first intended, or continued and intended
domicile, is socially unbearable. Every state of the Union is free, and
the majority of states are likely to uphold under their own laws a
marriage valid under the law of celebration without reference to where
the spouses were domiciled or intended to make their home at the time of
marriage.5" Any other conclusion can be understood only under a theory
which assumes a status immutably "vesting" at the time, and only at
the time, of the ceremony, or in other words a system of "legislative
jurisdictions""5 established by a superlaw outside of the Constitution.
Such a system has never existed. 9
MARRIAOES INVALID WHERE CELEBRATED
In 1821 Lord Stowell, in Ruding v. Smith,6" remarked that while "a
foreign marriage, valid according to the law of the place where cele-
brated, is good every where else," the courts have "not & converso estab-
lished that marriages of British subjects, not good according to the
general law of the place where celebrated, are universally .. .to be
regarded as invalid in England."" But in 1834, Justice Story, partly
relying on this case and partly on other cases not here pertinent,62 stated
the general proposition that a marriage invalid where celebrated "is
equally invalid every where."63  Story also relied on Kent and Lord
Kames. But the former had limited himself to the validity rule 4 which
was discussed in the first part of this study, and Lord Kames had urged
the very opposite of Story's proposition, namely that "Justice
57 On the concept of status, see Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 174 (1959).
58 Beale, et al., supra note 5, at 503. See note 4 supra.
69 Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 8 (1959).
6o 2 Hag. Con. 371, 390, 161 Eng. Rep. 774, 781 (1821). The rule of this case which
validated a marriage celebrated between British subjects at the Cape by a chaplain of the
British forces in contravention of local Dutch law, is apparently limited to cases "where
the use of the local form is impossible" and where "one of the parties is a member" of
occupying forces. Dicey's Conflict of Laws 230 (7th ed. 1958).
61 Ruding v. Smith, supra note 60, at 390, 161 Eng. Rep. at 781.
62 Among these, Scrimshire v. Scrimshire, 2 Hag. Con. 390, 161 Eng. Rep. 782 (1752),
is the one most cited. Here a French marriage between British subjects conducted "by a
Popish priest after the English ritual" (at 786) was held void under French law though it
would have been merely "irregular" (at 783) under English law. As interpreted by later
cases, this decision was one based on a prior French annulment. Harford v. Morris, 2 Hag.
Con. 423, 432, 161 Eng. Rep. 792, 795 (1776), upholding a marriage between British
subjects in Austrian Flanders and Denmark in violation of local law, and distinguishing
the Scrimshire case on that ground.
63 Story, Conflict of Laws 104 (1834).
64 Kent, Commentaries 91 (2d ed. 1832).
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requires that a marriage be held good here, though not formal according
to the law of the country where it was made, provided the will and pur-
pose of the parties to unite in marriage clearly appear."6 5 It seems very
probable that Story, like some of his successors, was carried away by that
crave for symmetry which was to reach its fateful climax in Beale's
teaching. That his theory did not state existing law is made likely by
such decisions as that of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1840,
where that court reaffirmed the observation of the Ruding court for the
law of the United States in the very words of Lord Stowell 6 To be
sure, by the end of the nineteenth century most writers seem to have
accepted Story's counterpart of the validity rule.6 7 But the equation is
anything but compelling.
In the first place, differentiation between the validating and invalidat-
ing effects of the law of celebration seems indicated in the light of the
history of American law. Most other countries refer the validity of
marriages to the personal laws of the parties. The deviation of the
American rule from this pattern has in part been ascribed to the desire
of a country of "immigration and pioneering" not to permit "require-
ments of the old countries. . . . to impede marriages necessary to new
settlers. 6 8 While this desire is not inconsistent with the recognition of
foreign marriages under the law of celebration, it would be defeated by
the non-recognition under that law of foreign marriages which satisfy
American conceptions.
Nor is the equation between marriages valid at the place of celebration
with those invalid there "logical" in any sense. As I have tried to show
in a series of articles on the conflicts law of contracts, 9 courts in this
field have usually applied what I have called the "law of validation"
under which a contract (other than one of adhesion)"M will in accordance
65 2 Kames, Principles of Equity 324 (1778). Since Lord Kames does not treat of
capacity to marry, and since form and capacity in his time were treated alike (see text
accompanying note 26 supra), his statement seems applicable to capacity as well. On Lord
Kames' earlier authority in this country, see Nadelmarn, "Joseph Story and George
Joseph Bell," 1959 Jurid. Rev. 31.
66 Phillips v. Gregg, 10 Watts 158, 168 (Pa. 1844).
67 See, e.g., Field, Outlines of an International Code § 548 (2d ed 1876); 1 Bishop,
Marriage and Divorce 329 (1864). Rorer, American Inter-State Law 178 (1879), relies on
Greenwood v. Curtis, 6 Mass. 358 (1810) (foreign contract valid where made), and Cheever
v. Wilson, 9 Wall. (76 U.S.) 108 (1869) (wife's domicile for divorce), both irrelevant.
68 1 Rabel, Conflict of Laws 312 (2d ed. 1958).
69 See the following articles by Ehrenzweig: "The Real Estate Broker and the Conflict
of Laws," 59 Colum. L. Rev. 303 (1959); "Contractual Capacity of Married Women
and Infants in the Conflict of Laws," 43 Minn. L. Rev. 899 (1959); "The Statute of
Frauds in the Conflict of Laws," 59 Colum. L. Rev. 874 (1959); "Contracts in the Conflict
of Laws," 59 Colum. L. Rev. 973, 1171 (1959); Book Review, 12 Leg. Ed. J. 137 (1959);
"Releases of Concurrent Tort-feasors in the Conflict of Laws," 46 Va. L. Rev. 712 (1960).
70 Ehrenzweig, "Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws," 53 Colum. L. Rev. 1072
(1953).
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with the intention of the parties at the time of contracting, be upheld
under any one of the court's "proper laws", except in certain well-
defined situations characterized by strong governmental interests
to the contrary. 71 The same conclusion applies a fortiori to the
law governing the contract of marriage.72  Courts have, therefore, as
has been shown,7 narrowly limited exceptions to the general recognition
of marriages valid at the place of celebration while, on the other hand,
always refusing to limit themselves to that law in order to uphold a mar-
riage. As late as 1883, American courts seem to have been unwilling
to accept a general regime of invalidity under the law of celebration.7'
And it is hardly a coincidence that this hesitation has been shared by
all states which have ever approached the subject by statute. They
have, directly or indirectly, borrowed from the first rule of Field's
International Code,75 which acknowledges the ubiquitous validity of
marriages valid at the place of celebration. But they have rejected his
second rule which declares invalid marriages invalid at the place of
celebration. 76 The fact that Field had admitted to a lack of authority for
this second rule7' may have had some bearing on this legislative decision.
Notwithstanding all these considerations and the total absence of
authority, Professor Beale "restated" the law to be that any marriage
failing to comply with mandatory requirements of the place of celebra-
71 In this sense a governmental interest is understood, in its narrowest sense, as an interest
of the (forum or foreign) government itself, in contrast to Professor Currie's terminology.
See, e.g., Currie, "On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum," 58 Colum. L. Rev.
964 (1958).
72 The Institute itself has recognized this. Thus, it would admit validity under the law
of continued and intended domicile generally, while limiting invalidity under that law, even
of evasionary marriages (Rest. Second, Tent. Draft § 129), to cases affecting "an overriding
public policy" of that law. Rest. Second, Tent. Draft 118. See also, generally, id. at 100,
102. This limitation may yet be included in the black letter text. ALI Proceedings, supra
note 48, at 440.
73 See p. 663 supra. For cases more than liberally construing foreign laws as holding
the marriage valid, see, e.g., Loring v. Thorndike, 87 Mass. 257 (1862); In re Lando's
Estate, 112 Minn. 257, 127 N.W. 1125 (1910).
74 See Hynes v. McDermott, 91 N.Y. 451 (1883), leaving the question undecided as one
requiring "careful consideration." See also Canale v. People, 177 Ill. 219, 52 N.E. 310
(1898), involving an Italian marriage between Italians held invalid under Italian law "in
favor of the innocence of the accused."
75 Supra note 39, at 382.
76 Cal. Civ. Code § 63 (Deering 1949) (first enacted 1872); Idaho Code Ann. § 32-209
(1947) (first enacted 1872); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 90-1-5 (1953); Kan. Gen Stat. Ann.
§ 23-115 (1949) (first enacted 1867); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 402.040 (1959) (limited to forum
residents); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 48-113 (1947) (first enacted 1887); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 42-119 (1952); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-1-4 (1953) (first enacted 1862); N.D. Rev. Code §
14-0308 (1943) (first enacted 1895, residents excepted); S.D. Code § 14.0103 (1919); Utah
Code Ann. § 30-1-4 (1953) (first enacted 1898); Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 20-21 (1957)
(first enacted 1876). On the international scene, Article 2(3) of the Hague Convention
of May 29, 1900, followed a similar approach by permitting, under each spouse's national
law, the validation of marriages invalid at the place of celebration. Acts de la 3 6me
Conference de la Haye pour le droit international priv6 346 (1900). See also, for the
English version, Baty, Polarized Law 13 (1914).
77 Field, Outlines of an International Code 383 (2d ed. 1876).
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tion was "invalid everywhere."7 8 To be sure, in its Restatement Second,
the Institute now seems willing to concede validating effect at least to
the law of the state of continued and intended domicile. 79 But law and
reason demand a fundamentally different answer. For the result of the
alleged invalidity rule, even within this now more limited scope, is wholly
unacceptable in those cases in which the ground of invalidity is one
obnoxious, or at least indifferent, to the forum, as in cases of non-age,
in most cases of so-called incest, and particularly in cases of miscegena-
tion.
In a California court a "Negro" woman claims California property
left by her "white" husband. The couple had lived in California ever
since their marriage, which had been celebrated in Nevada where they
were then domiciled. Under the Institute's proposed "rule" the Cali-
fornia court would have to deny her claim because Nevada then invali-
dated such marriages and California was not the state of the continued
and intended domicile. Indeed, under this formula the result would be
the same even if the widow, before going to Nevada, had been domiciled
in California or, in the absence of such prior domicile, had, like her hus-
band, intended to settle in that state at the time of her marriage.
This "rule" lacks support in authority and is objectionable on policy
grounds. First, it would deny validating effect to the law of the state of
the spouses' first (intended or actual) domicile if that state was not also
the state of either party's prior, and thus continued, domicile. The justi-
fication for this result offered in the Institute's Draft is unsatisfactory.
It is true that otherwise "the validity of the marriage might on occasion
be governed by the law of a state where the parties have never been."
But it is irrelevant that that state, "as of the time of the marriage, [has]
little interest in them."" ° All that would be needed to avoid the rejected
result would be to eliminate the "intention" test (also otherwise objec-
tionable as largely fictitious and fortuitous), and to give validity to any
marriage valid under the law of the parties' first actual postnuptial domi-
cile. The assumption underlying the Draft of an exclusive "paramount
interest" of "legislative jurisdiction" of the state of the parties' pre-
nuptial domicile has precluded this simple solution.
Second, the "rule" of the Draft would deny validating effect to the
78 Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 122 (1934). 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws 674 (1935)
cites only one case for this proposition. Schaffer v. Krestnovnikow, 88 N.J. Eq. 192, 102
At. 246 (1917), motion to receive record in evidence denied, 88 NJ. Eq. 523, 103 At. 913
(1918), aff'd, 89 N.J. Eq. 549, 105 At. 239 (1918). But all that this case held was that
one assailing the validity of a second marriage had not "overcome the powerful presump-
tion of the legality of the marriage" by proving the validity of a previous marriage allegedly
invalid under the law of celebration.
79 Rest. Second, Tent. Draft § 132.
80 Rest. Second, Tent. Draft 120.
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law of the state of the parties' present domicile (i.e., their domicile at
the time of the litigation). The Draft defends this denial on the ground
that "after the marriage the parties might change their mind, and, after
having gone to their intended domicile, decide to make their home in
another state.""' Indeed, they might. It may certainly be doubted, to
quote the Draft, "whether a state where the parties do not intend to live
has a sufficient interest to outweigh the general policy in favor of up-
holding the validity of marriages." 2 But the same doubt should have
been acknowledged as to the state of either party's domicile at the time
of marriage, the so-called state of "paramount interest," and as to the
state of celebration itself. Or, in other words, a marriage may be upheld
not only under the law of the state of celebration, but also under the law
of either party's domicile at the time of marriage or of the parties'
domicile at the time of the commencement of the suit. The last state, if
any, has the paramount interest in the parties' marital status. Several
techniques are available for reaching this result within the traditional
framework.
In the first place, the forum, at least where it coincides with the
spouses' present domicile, can simply disregard any foreign invalidity
law and apply the primary validity law of the forum in the absence of a
compelling reason to the contrary."' Decisions to this effect have usually
been concerned with the violations of foreign form requirements8 4 and
have reached this result whether or not such requirements were "manda-
tory" in Restatement parlance.85 Fraud 6 and lack of capacity at the
81 Ibid. For a forceful, but apparently unsuccessful, attack against the Draft on this
point see judge Mars' remarks in ALI Proceedings 437 (1957). But see also id. at 444.
82 Rest. Second, Tent. Draft at 120.
83 This general thesis I have tried to develop in my forthcoming paper on "The Lex Fori
-Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws," 58 Mich. L. Rev. 637 (1960). For a prelimi-
nary talk on this topic, see Ehrenzweig, "Lex Fori-Exception or Rule?," 32 Rocky Mt. L.
Rev. 13 (1959). See also note 69 supra.
84 In Ferret v. Ferret, 55 N.M. 565, 237 P.2d 594 (1951), the validity of a Spanish civil
marriage, though contrary to present Spanish law, was upheld as conforming with the law
in effect at the time of the ceremony. The underlying policy sustaining the validity of mar-
riages which violate mere form requirements of the place of marriage is illustrated by
Starkowski v. Attorney General, (1953] 2 All E.R. 1272, where the House of Lords, in the
converse case, upheld an Austrian religious marriage invalid under the German law then
in force by conceding retroactive effect to a subsequent validating Austrian law. On the
problem of intertemporal conflicts in general, see Gavalda, Les conflits dans le temps en
droit international priv6 (1955). Where Commonwealth courts have to deal with mar-
riages violating form requirements of the law of the place of contracting, they now seem
inclined, at least in such situations as those involving members of occupying forces, to give
validating effect to the English law of the forum. See e.g., Taczanowska v. Taczanowska,
(1957) P. 301, 2 All E.R. 563, where a marriage between foreign domiciliaries in Italy was
upheld under English common law though it was invalid under the laws of both marriage
and domicile; and see generally Mendez da Costa, "The Formalities of Marriage in the
Conflict of Laws," 7 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 217 (1958); Andrews, "The Common Law
Marriage," 22 Modem L. Rev. 396 (1959).
85 Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 122 (1934) ; Rest. Second, Tent. Draft § 122.
88 Such decisions as Levy v. Levy, 209 Mass. 230, 34 N.E.2d 650 (1941), upholding a
New York marriage, and Damaskinos v. Damaskinos, 325 Mass. 217, 89 NE.2d 766 (1950),
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place of celebration have occasionally been treated in the same manner.
Thus, marriages alleged to be invalid or voidable because of non-age8 7
or remarriage prohibitions" have been upheld, on varying grounds, with-
out reference to either the law of celebration or domicile.
In the second place, those states which have held or will yet hold
annulling a New York marriage, can, though both purport to rely on New York law,
probably be most easily reconciled on an evaluation of the facts in the light of forum
policy concerning fraud. The treatment of duress has been similar. See, e.g., Lyon v. Lyon,
230 Ill. 366, 82 N.E. 850 (1907).
87 In Portwood v. Portwood, 109 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937), a marriage con-
cluded in Oklahoma, where it was void or voidable, was upheld in open reliance upon the
law of the forum as such. Id. at 522, 523. In Parks v. Parks, 218 N.C. 245, 10 S.E.2d 807
(1940), a marriage of North Carolina citizens, concluded in Virginia, was upheld after
ratification, because under the law of the forum (rather than that of celebration) a non-
age marriage was only voidable. In Dowdell v. Dowdell, 3 Bucks Co. L. Rep. 140 (Pa.
1954), the law of celebration was presumed to be identical with that of the forum which
upheld the marriage. Such holdings are often based on forum statutes which specify
grounds for annulment and which are interpreted as statutes establishing a compulsory
overriding choice of law rule. See, e.g., Capasso v. Colonna, 96 N.J. Eq. 385, 124 At. 760
(1924), upholding a marriage voidable for non-age under the New York law of celebration
but valid under the law of New Jersey, the law of the forum and domicile. To the same
effect is Du Pont v. Du Pont, 47 Del. (8 Terry) 231, 90 A.2d 468, cert. denied,
344 U.S. 836 (1952), where a marriage voidable under the New York law of celebration
[in the opinion of the lower court more readily than at the forum, Anon. v. Anon., 46
Del. (7 Terry) 458, 85 A.2d 706, 715 (1951)], was upheld on the ground, inter alia, that,
although New York law was applicable, the court had no "power" to decree an annuilment
under it (at 90 A.2d 493). It may be hoped that Cruickshank v. Cruickshank, 193 Misc.
366, 82 N.Y.S.2d 522 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1948), does not state the law of New York.
In that case the California marriage of a 19-year old New Yorker with a 22-year old
California "divorcee" was annulled as violating the California consent requirement, although
the marriage would have been valid if celebrated in New York, the plaintiff's own domicile.
The court distinguished Bays v. Bays, 105 Misc. 492, 174 N.Y. Supp. 212 (Sup. Ct. Cortland
County 1918), which had upheld a marriage voidable under the Pennsylvania law of
celebration, on the untenable ground that plaintiff in the case at bar was only 19 years old
(rather than 20 as in Bays), defendant only 22 years old (rather than 30), and that plain-
tiff in the case at bar was "far removed from the stabilizing influence of his parents and
his home surroundings." The only other case that could be found which seemingly supports
this approach is Von Felden v. Von Felden, 212 Minn. 54, 2 N.W.2d 426 (1942), where a
marriage voidable under the Iowa law of celebration was annulled, although it would have
been valid in the state of forum and domicile. But the decision was apparently equivalent
to a divorce by consent (annulled as of the time of the annullment) and was based upon
a "mutual error of selection" and lack of consummation. [On the relevance of the last
fact, see Beale, et al., supra note 5, at 519]. Travis v. Travis, 19 D. & C. 505 (Pa. 1934) is
obscure. West Virginia law there was quoted as establishing minimum ages of 18 and 16,
and the spouses' ages exceeded this minimum. In Sirois v. Sirois, 94 N.H. 215, 50 A.2d 88
(1946), conflicts rules were unnecessarily invoked. See generally Comment, 49 Colum. L.
Rev. 693 (1949).
88 When upholding foreign marriages concluded in contravention of marriage prohibitions
of third divorcing states, some courts have purported to defer to the laws of celebration
or domicile. But usually they have referred to the law of the divorcing court and have
declared it inapplicable as penal or lacking extraterritorial effect. See, e.g., People v.
Woodey, 22 Cal. App. 674, 136 Pac. 312 (1913) ; Means v. Means, 40 Cal. App. 2d 469, 104
P.2d 1066 (1940); In re Winder's Estate, 98 Cal. App. 2d 78, 219 P.2d 18 (1950); In re
Tersip's Estate, 86 Cal. App. 2d 43, 194 P.2d 66 (1948); Fisch v. Marler, 1 Wash. 2d 698,
97 P.2d 147 (1939) ; In re Peart's Estate, 277 App. Div. 61, 97 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1st Dep't 1950) ;
King v. Klemp, 26 N.J. Misc. 140, 57 A.2d 530 (Ch. 1947); Henderson v. Henderson, 199
Md. 449, 87 A.2d 403 (1952); Bauer v. Abrahams, 73 Colo. 509, 216 Pac. 259 (1923). But
see, e.g., Huard v. McTeigh, 113 Ore. 279, 232 Pac. 658 (1925) (British Columbia marriage
in violation of Washington prohibition invalid under British Columbia law). See generally
Tintor, "Marriage in the Conflict of Laws," 9 Vand. L. Rev. 607, 625 (1956); Kingsley,
"Remarriage after Divorce," 26 So. Cal. L. Rev. 280 (1953); Annot., 32 A.L.R. 1116,
1142 (1924).
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their miscegenation statutes unconstitutional, may and should disregard
on this ground such foreign statutes. The only case which has been
found to raise this issue has so held. In Gregory v. Gregory,9 the trial
court, without reference to the parties' premarital domicile, upheld an
interracial marriage which had been concluded in Nevada, disregarding
the miscegenation statute of that state as unconstitutional by virtue of
the decision of the California Supreme Court invalidating a similar forum
statute 0 English courts would reach the same result by characterizing
the foreign statute as "penal." 91 Finally, in this country, the reasoning
of a leading court in a comparable, though distinguishable, case may be
applicable to the validation of marriages invalid where celebrated, with-
out resort to constitutional rulings. In In re Lund's Estate,9 2 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court upheld the inheritance claim to California property
of an illegitimate nonresident son of a California resident by virtue of a
"public acknowledgment" effected in Minnesota or New Mexico. The
acknowledgment, though ineffective under Minnesota or New Mexico
law, was held to satisfy the requirements of California law and thus to
have legitimated the claimant. The legal significance of this act, or "lack
thereof, in Minnesota and New Mexico is not binding on California. It
is its factual significance which is controlling." Judge Goodrich finds this
decision "difficult to explain."'9 3 And, similarly, a dissenting judge in
Guevara v. Inland Steel Co. 4 found a departure from "any known pat-
tern of the authorities on conflict of laws" in the theory of the Supreme
Court of Indiana which could find five years' common law widowhood,
for the purposes of workmen's compensation, of a woman who had lived
with the deceased as his common law wife in Illinois and Indiana for the
the statutory period. "Upon every consideration of logic" the dissent
denied the existence of a married status during the couple's stay in
Illinois since that state did not recognize common law marriages and
since "a pretended marriage void at the place of celebration or origin
cannot be made valid by the law of another state."9 5 The majority of the
court, deciding the case for plaintiff without opinion, apparently rejected
this argument.
89 2 Los Angeles Daily J.R. 234 (Super. Ct. Los Angeles County, July 3, 1951). For a
recent case declaring unconstitutional the statute of a sister state, see Conn v. Whitmore,
9 Utah 2d 250, 342 P.2d 871, 875 (1959).
90 Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948). See 1 Armstrong, Family Law 26
(1953).
91 Dicey's Conflict of Laws 266 (7th ed. 1958).
92 26 Cal. 2d 472, 493, 159 P.2d 643, 655 (1945). See also Colpitt v. Cheatham, 267
P.2d 1003 (Okla. 1954). But cf. Nevarez v. Bailon, 287 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
93 Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 436 (3d ed. 1949).
94 228 Ind. 135, 90 N.E.2d 347 (1950).
95 Id. at 90 N.E.2d 349.
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Whichever technique the court may choose, marriages can and will be
upheld though invalid at the place of celebration, not only if a spouse
was then, and intended to remain, domiciled in a state recognizing such
marriages, as the Institute would have it, but also if the marriage would
have been held valid in the state of either party's domicile at the time of
marriage whether or not the spouses intended to make their home there,
or in the state of the parties' domicile at the time the action was com-
menced.
Some states will continue to let their "overriding policy" invalidate
marriages valid in one of those states. But in law and reason, and con-
trary to both Restatements, there is no indication whatsoever that a third
state would follow such a policy even though it be the policy of a state
of so-called "paramount interest." Even concerning problems other than
those of miscegenation, invalidation under the laws of a state other than
that of the forum and present domicile seems rare. And where such hold-
ings occur doubts as to their soundness seem justified. Thus, many will
regret the decision of the New York court by which it annulled, under
the non-age rule of California, the California marriage of a nineteen year
old New York domiciliary though New York law would have upheld
a domestic marriage between the same parties. 6 But even if such de-
cisions can occasionally be justified as supporting the anti-evasion poli-
cies of sister states, no such claim can be made with regard to interracial
marriages.
Two criticisms of the solutions here proposed could be raised. It
could properly be said that if the spouses had previously separated, such
a solution would fail to give validating effect to the law of each spouse's
domicile at the time suit is commenced. It seems impossible, however,
to state a rule covering this case which could claim general applicability.
There may be states reluctant to give validating effect to the law of a
domicile conceivably chosen by either spouse for the very purpose of
securing this effect against the other. And other states may consider
maximum validation more desirable than prevention of forum shopping.
It might also be urged that a unitary status is the most important
single aim of the conflicts law governing marriages, and that only gen-
eral adherence to the law of the parties' first matrimonial domicile can
secure achievement of this aim. To this there is a simple answer: It is
the proposed solution, rather than the Restatement "rule," which
would advance this aim. Nobody can seriously expect any majority
state, particularly that of celebration or present marital domicile, to
invalidate a marriage merely because a minority state would be so
96 Cruickshank v. Cruickshank, supra note 87.
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inclined. By encouraging the latter to do so, the Restatement would
promote a multiple status. Under the proposed rule, however, invalida-
tion by any state would presuppose invalidity under all three laws-that
of celebration, that of the spouses' continued and intended domicile, and
that of their present domicile-and thus would promote unity of status,
though "it is impossible ever wholly to avoid the unpleasant possibility
of a person being married in one jurisdiction and not in another.197
CONCLUSION
Either of two ultimate solutions would remove most conflicts problems
in the field of marriage law in general. Increasing participation of the
state in the marriage ceremony could make feasible the application to
sister state marriages of principles of full faith and credit to judgments. 8
Conversely, decreasing interference by the state with the parties' agree-
ment may restore to that agreement its ancient standing under the com-
mon laws of England, Rome, and, indeed, the Church. Unless and until
either solution is reached some states will continue to apply their re-
strictive standards to marriages of their domiciliaries validly concluded
abroad. How far these states now do so, or should do so, cannot, at this
time, be stated or "restated" with any assurance. On the other hand,
it can be said, on both law and reason, that third states in which the
spouses are domiciled at the time of the commencement of the suit have
never considered themselves, and most certainly should not consider
themselves, bound to apply these standards if contrary to their own
conceptions. If any state is the state of "paramount interest" in this
respect, it is the state of the spouses' present, rather than that of their
premarital or intended, domicile. And courts of this state will validate
a marriage under any law "properly" supporting an intended union.
Techniques now used to reach this result are not ready for consistent
analysis. But if this result is to be restated, a rule emerges which, if
it were to replace sections 121, 122, and 132 of the Second Restatement,
could be formulated as follows:
A marriage is valid if it is valid according to the law of the state where
the marriage took place, or where at least one of the parties was domiciled
at the time of marriage, or where the parties were domiciled at the time
suit was commenced; provided only that [to use the words of Lord
Kames] "the will and purpose of the parties to unite in marriage clearly
appears, ' 9 and that the marriage is not offensive to an overriding policy
of the forum.
97 Note, 11 Colum. L. Rev. 767, 770 (1911). See also Deik, "Conflict of Laws: Recent
Development Concerning Marriage," 27 Mich. L. Rev. 389 (1929).
98 Note 15 supra.
99 Note 65 supra.
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I believe that such a rule would correctly restate existing law in
marriage conflicts cases in general. If the proposed rule should not be
acceptable at this time in its generality without a complete study and
analysis of the case law as to each typical fact situation, this rule is,
as I have attempted to show in this article, entitled to immediate recog-
nition as to miscegenation cases. But the very least, I submit, that the
American Law Institute now owes to the dignity of the nation and our
profession is expressly to declare in its draft of a Second Restatement
of the Law of Conflict of Laws that "marriages between persons of
different races" are exempt from the new regime of the "state of para-
mount interest."
